Introduction
In the week leading up to beginning work on writing this chapter, I had the pleasure of spending time at my family's holiday house located in Goolwa, South Australia. Goolwa is located on the lands of the Ngarrendjeri people, the First Nations people whose sovereignty over the lands continues despite the ongoing effects of colonisation. I have been visiting Goolwa since I was a small child, and have a strong sense of affinity for the township and those that neighbour it. On this trip I revisited some of the sites that hold the strongest resonance as signifiers of what Goolwa represents to me. Specifically, the accumulation of sexuality, the 'we' was a group of non-indigenous, primarily white, students who had elected into the topic. My reading of the group was that these were a group of relatively liberal students who had a desire to know more about issues of gender and sexuality as they pertain to social work, but that through their liberalism they, at least in part, felt they were already somewhere along the track to engaging in an inclusive approach to gender and sexuality.
Second, and following on from the first point, is the fact that in being a class of nonindigenous students lead by a non-indigenous lecturer, we were all standing on land in which we had some form of stake, but to which we had an ethically suspect claim to belong. This was an important starting place, as it would have been far too easy for us all to perpetuate the assumption that the 'we' was constituted by a group of 'well meaning' people who, in talking critically about gender and sexuality, were somehow outside the operations of colonisation that afford us the government-granted right to stand on the land and speak. That we acknowledged that we stood on Kaurna land, and that we spoke about this standing and what it meant for us to do so, was thus an important aspect of both the opening session of the topic, but also in the weeks that followed as we sought to unpack the differential impact of the built environs upon varying groups of people.
And third, the question of place has specific implications not only in terms of whose land we were standing on (and on whose land I work in Adelaide, and upon whose land I stay when I visit Goolwa), but from whose land the built environs are made. Coleman (2010) speaks of the modernity of buildings in the city of Adelaide -modern in the greater scheme of Indigenous ownership of the land -and the materials from which they are made. She speaks of the fact that not only do such buildings sit on stolen land, but also that they are made of materials that too are stolen. To sit inside the buildings at my university and to teach within them is thus to think about what it means to have the luxury of often unwittingly being surrounded by another person's property that has both been appropriated, but which nonetheless carries with it the sovereignty of the people from which it is taken. As I looked out the windows in the teaching room, and as I now look out the windows of my family's holiday house, I see not simply the environs and the land that is not rightfully mine, but I also see the windows through which I look, the sands from which they are made, and the stories that those sands hold. Importantly, to 'see' country in this way is not about evoking an idealised 'pre-colonial' landscape, in which myself as the colonial subject invents a fantasy of a world without colonisation (Chow, 1994; Riggs, 2004) . Rather, my point here, drawing on Coleman's work, is that the colonial past is very much the colonial present, locked up as it is in both the material and psychical relations that shape the spaces we all move in.
Who is standing
Of course where we stand is almost inseparable from who is doing the standing, as denoted above in my discussion of the 'we' who were standing in my gender and sexuality topic. In the narrative that I opened this chapter with, I am clearly located not simply as a non- In regards to the question of who is standing, and in reference to my gender and sexuality class, the task we engaged in was to find ways of looking at who we stand as through our relationships to other people. This involved, as Sanjay Sharma (2006) notes, a focus both on the 'concrete other' (i.e., the actual people upon whose disadvantage our privilege rests), and the 'ontological other' (i.e., the other as a category against and through which our sense of self is formed). To stand as a non-indigenous Australian, and moreover to teach as a nonindigenous Australian to non-indigenous students, is to acknowledge that who we stand as is always a consequence: it is always a product or outcome of an ongoing series of historical relations between actual colonisers and actual Indigenous nations and peoples, as well as the ongoing social hierarchies in which these categories are made to matter. As such, and as Ahmed (2006) again notes, it is racism that produces race, not vice versa. In the context of a colonial nation such as Australia, it is colonialism itself -and its accompanying practices of empire that were informed by a possessive investment in land and a logic of patriarchal white sovereignty (Moreton-Robinson, 2004 ) that treats others (in this case Indigenous people) as objects to be dispossessed -that produces the hierarchical power relations in which I am made to matter as a non-indigenous person (Fanon, 1967) .
Perhaps part of what I am suggesting, then, is that indigeneity, or one's status as an Indigenous person (or not), functions as a superordinate category in Australia. In stating this, my claim is not per se to argue for a ranking of identity categories; indeed, much of my focus in teaching the gender and sexuality topic was on intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1991) as a means for understanding the complexities of identity. Rather, my point is that, in a nation founded on colonisation, and in a nation that continues in many ways to deny the ongoing effects of genocide and dispossession, whether or not one identifies as Indigenous has a particular set of consequences for identity formation, even if this isn't readily apparent to, or indeed is wilfully denied by, many non-indigenous people. Thinking about who is standing thus requires us to think about the ontological claims that accompany this. I will return to this point later in the chapter, but it is important to note here that within the topic on gender and sexuality I drew upon Beryl Curt's (1994) notion of the individual as a 'fold' of the social to highlight how the latter always already produces subjectivities according to existing social cultural hierarchies, and through which such subjectivities are rendered intelligible. Thus, as Alison Ravenscroft (2003) suggests in her analysis of the work of Kathleen Mary Fallon (a white lesbian woman who has written publically about being a foster carer of an Indigenous child); 'she is the colonising subject and she acts against this and she is the colonising subject and…' (241). Here Ravenscroft clearly marks the both/and nature of colonising subjectivities: that in being formed through a relationship to ongoing histories of colonisation, non-indigenous people -even those who engage in an anti-racist praxis -are inextricably bound up in the effects and affects of colonisation. Who speaks, then, is always an effect of power, one that brings with it a particular injunction to consider the representational components of colonisation, as I discuss in the following section.
Before going on to discuss how we represent the places upon which we stand, however, it is important to note a further point about who is standing. As I stated earlier, my class was comprised of non-indigenous students. This demands the question of why this is the casewhy is the student body in all of the topics I teach almost entirely comprised of nonindigenous students, especially given the fact that government reports continue to indicate that, since the early 2000's, the numbers of Indigenous students enrolled in university courses are increasing (e.g., Schwab, 2006) . The answer to this question lies in the fact that such reports indicate that whilst the numbers of Indigenous students enrolling in higher education are increasing, the nature of such enrolments is limited in at least three ways: 1) Indigenous students typically enrol in 'new universities' (which are seen as less prestigious than older universities; have high numbers of students taught by low numbers of staff; and are often funded at lower levels than older universities), 2) Indigenous students may often fail to complete degrees or may undertake non-award degrees, and that 3) for those students who undertake award degrees, these are typically in the humanities or arts. Thus whilst the numbers of Indigenous students enrolled is increasing, this does not necessarily translate into a significantly greater number of Indigenous people with higher degrees, or degrees that straightforwardly translate into higher numbers of Indigenous people who are able to gain employment as a result of their degree. As Schwab notes, some of these outcomes may be intentional choices made by Indigenous students that are informed by their cultural and worldviews. However for many Indigenous students, their higher education 'choices' are still curtailed by the impact of racism, finance, family responsibilities, and the effects of intergenerational trauma arising from genocide and dispossession. The who that I see in my classrooms, then, is not simply about who I see (i.e., primarily white middle-class students who will go onto reasonably well paid professional careers), but also who I don't see (i.e., Indigenous students for whom educational outcomes may be considerably disparate to those of non-indigenous students). This point about who actually enrols in my gender and sexuality topic has considerable implications for how I represent non-western standpoints within the topic, as I discuss in the following section.
How we represent standing
Who is standing and on whose land were thus central questions within the gender and sexuality topic, ones that required ongoing examination and ones that framed how the subsequent pedagogic material was presented. From my perspective, taking a traditional approach of 'once there was this and now there is that' would only have served to retain a focus on the 'what' of colonisation, but not the 'why' and 'how' of colonisation. Focusing instead on the latter allowed us to discuss colonisation as a structuring logic that shapes our very capacity to see what is before us. Much like my reflections upon my desire to visit Kumarangk/Hindmarsh Island again, looking at who we speak as and how we speak (i.e., what authority sanctions us to do so) was an important component of actively seeking to explore how, in the very act of speaking of ourselves, it was potentially possible to catch a glimpse of all that lay outside our frame of reference.
Yet in terms of affect, 'catching a glimpse' doesn't necessarily produce anything beyond a sense either of guilt, or possibly helplessness, for non-indigenous students. What we had to do, in relation to both our discussions of colonisation and heteronormativity, was to consider what we could do ethically with these glimpses. In this regard, there are many models evoked by non-indigenous people that are claimed to foster a sense of belonging to land, yet all of which I would suggest involve acts of appropriation or colonisation. For example, and as and sexualities, so to speak; and they cannot be reduced to the anatomy of any one white elite' (p. 68). Similarly, and as Carolyn Epple (1998) notes in her work on the Navajo nádleehí, within a Navajo world view the meanings attached to clothing or jewellery do not automatically map across onto a reading of gendered differences. As Epple suggests, terms such as 'berdarche' or 'two-spirit' fail to capture a Navaho worldview in regards to differences between bodies, and instead reduce nádleehí bodies to being 'just like' transgender people in the west.
Indigenous sistergirls in Australia too have written and spoken about the ways in which western concepts of gender do not match up with Indigenous understandings of identity.
Kooncha Brown, for example, in her documentary and writing (2004; 2006) , speaks of the ways in which sistergirls were viewed within Indigenous cultures prior to colonisation, where in some cultures sistergirls were included and valued whilst in others this was not the case.
Importantly, whilst Brown does not paint an idealised image of the inclusion of sistergirls within Indigenous cultures, she nonetheless emphasises the negative effects of colonisation upon sistergirls, including the enforcement of stereotyped traditional gender roles upon Indigenous communities by colonisers, the forcing of gendered violence upon sistergirls (such as rape or sex work), and the higher risk that this now places sistergirls for contracting STDs. Again, then, the voices of sistergirls reminded us in the gender and sexuality class both that there are experiences of gender and sexuality that exist outside the west, and that these cannot be easily (or usefully) represented within the standard categories available within the west. That those of us who live in the west inhabit a range of identity categories that historically were developed in opposition to (or indeed drew upon) those encountered as part of colonisation is undoubtable. But the assumption that it is the other that differs from the normative western self (treated as the centre) is thrown into question when we consider cultural practices that precede and exceed western colonial inscription.
When it comes to talking about the white western self, and particularly in regards to gender and sexuality (as I have done elsewhere, see Riggs, 2010), Sharma's (2006) use of the rhizome is again productive. Through the figure of the rhizome we can very much see how the white heterosexual middle-class Australian self is constructed as the normative centre, but we can also see how that occurs as a result of the location of this identity at the intersection of a range of categories that simultaneously, rather than cumulatively, produce a site of privilege that always sits alongside the figure of the ontological other. Yet at the same time, the status of this identity position as also non-indigenous draws our attention to a founding problem in terms of its absolute authority. Indeed, this founding problem for white identities in Australia is perhaps usefully represented by the German term for multiple/intersecting identities -'Mehrfachzugehörigkeiten' -which as Gabi Rosenstreich (2007) Again, then, the figure of the rhizome reminds us that the white western self is as much a product of western discourses of race, difference, and sameness as is any other. Importantly, however, this is not to slip into a discourse of 'white people are different too', as Ahmed (2006) warns against. Rather, it is to recognise that the constitutive structures of white western notions of self bind white people to a vision of gender and sexuality that can't simply be undone by recourse to an 'exotic other' in order to forever and always prop up a normative white self. And it is in the recognition of this that lies the possibility of locating western notions of gender and sexuality within a broader cross-cultural framework that doesn't simply treat 'whiteness' as but one of many cultures, nor does it claim to be able to adequately speak for the concrete other. Instead, my point here is that the 'rules', if you like, of western discourses of gender and sexuality, are relatively readily explicable. That this can then be used to examine how such discourses are constituted through and against competing discourses, thus allowing for the fact of difference to stand whilst not reducing it to a western model or interpretation.
Why all this matters
Whilst writing this chapter I have repeatedly felt the need to pre-empt the question of how these wider discussions relate to the teaching of a course on gender and sexuality. For me, the most simple answer is that my university requires the 'inclusion' of Indigenous content across all courses, yet to date this has been patchy and typically undertaken in a way that yet again places Indigenous issues on the periphery. Of course, and as Ahmed (2006) My approach to teaching social work students has always been to try and move beyond a tick box approach, whilst also providing students with practical skills for when they enter the workface. A seemingly impossible task! Why all that I have covered in this chapter matters, then, is because it represents one attempt at moving beyond tick boxes that nonetheless provides critical thinking skills that allow students to recognise that the concrete other does possess knowledge, that such knowledge is not a product for consumption nor an object that can be easily incorporated, but that it will nonetheless structure their engagement with those different to themselves. Underpinning my attempts at undertaking this teaching has been a desire to instil in students an injunction to avoid rendering the challenges facing dominant groups in working with those in marginalised positions out to be the work of those who are marginalised. Understanding the position of the other, or at the very least comprehending that such a position exists and is valid, requires a move beyond a benevolent or paternalistic social work, and towards one in which concepts of 'self-determination' or 'cultural-competency' have some actual meaning outside of neo-liberal parlance. To expect that those who are marginalised will 'explain themselves' represents the most insidious rhetoric of selfdetermination, just as a tick box approach to 'learning about other cultures' is a counterproductive means to developing competence for working cross-culturally. My response in the gender and sexuality topic was to create a space where new meanings could be developed and attached to the terms 'gender and sexuality'. In so doing, my intent was that students would not only see the diverse enactments of gender and sexuality within western cultures, but that they could also place western expressions of gender and sexuality within a broader global framework that decentered the west without claiming to speak for the other.
Why this all matters is thus a very fair question to keep asking. For me, there lies a propensity within social work to believe that 'doing good' stems from 'meaning well'. As colonial, paternalistic, benevolent discourses about Indigenous people demonstrate, however, this is rarely the case. That the students I work with might possibly see themselves as both agents of change and potential weapons of oppression is thus, in my opinion, vital. And that they may challenge those they then work with to reconsider their own roles as agents of change and potential oppressors is equally important. That the contingency of western knowledge about gender and sexuality can be highlighted only to be decentered (but not replaced with a new, appropriated, centre) is thus perhaps the why that drives my teaching.
Concluding thoughts
To return to my opening narrative, it is useful to think again about how what was in effect a loss that I was voicing (albeit one that I accept as a fair piece of collateral damage on my behalf as a non-indigenous person), can produce some sort of ethical response. How, in other words, do we recognise the loss experienced by another, without taking it as our own, or refusing it as not our problem? And how do we at the same time create a space in which we can ethically speak of our own losses? Indigenous scholars and activists across Australia have repeatedly said that the process of reconciliation need not be one of guilt-mongering, nor nice neat tick box isn't the desirable outcome. Owning one's self, being one's self to the exclusion of others; that is but one way of being. Gaining a sense of self that takes into account one's own loss, and that is indeed accountable for the loss of others, might be something worth having, even if it requires a radical decentring of the non-indigenous self and the ways of being that inform it.
